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International codes and standards:
challenges and priorities for financial stability
The smooth functioning of the increasingly interdependent world economy requires the adoption
and observance of common rules. In the light of recent economic crises, it has become clear that the
effective implementation of codes and standards could contribute to strengthening financial stability
at the national level, and thereby, reduce the risks of spillover.
To effectively implement standards, a strategy has been defined within the international community
and tasks shared out: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank conduct
assessments of their member states’ observance of the main international standards.
Numerous hurdles nevertheless remain to be cleared in order to increase the contribution made by
codes and standards to prevent financial crises. Emerging economies’ ownership of codes and
standards must be strengthened, which requires these countries to be more closely involved in the
definition of standards, and also a more gradual approach in implementing standards to take account
of diverse levels of development. The importance given to the assessment of the implementation of
codes and standards is a noteworthy step forward in  IMF surveillance. It requires increased
co-ordination among international financial institutions (IFIs), other standard setting bodies such
as the Basel Committee, the OECD and the FATF, and the countries themselves. In addition, countries
to be assessed should be more carefully selected, clear priorities should be set in the areas covered by
standards and countries should be provided with greater incentives  to publish external assessment
results. Lastly, the private sector in developed countries could further encourage the implementation
of standards by factoring them more fully into its investment strategies, or by supplementing official
initiatives in respect of the assessment of observance.
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T
he ongoing debate on the restructuring of
sovereign debt and the resolution of financial
crises should not detract from the efforts that
the international community still needs to make with
regard to crisis prevention. A debate on the various
aspects of surveillance by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has been launched in this
context. The examination of the role played by codes
and standards, as well as the hurdles that need to be
cleared in order to speed up effective and rapid
implementation in a large number of countries, is
thus more relevant than ever.
Codes and standards embody a set of internationally-
recognised economic and financial principles and
practices. They are drawn up by international
NB: We would like to thank Alain LAURIN and Pierre-Michel FREMANN for their comments on this paper.144 FSR • International codes and standards • November 2002
institutions or groupings known as “standard setting
bodies”, notably the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD
and international groups of financial supervisors and
regulators. In March 2000, the Financial Stability
Forum designated 12 standards as key for financial
stability (see appendix). The codes may be divided
into three groups:
– Macroeconomic policy and transparency: monetary
and financial policy, fiscal policy and data
dissemination.
– Institutional and market infrastructure: creditor
rights and insolvency, corporate governance,
accounting and auditing, payment and securities
settlement systems, measures to combat money
laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.
– Financial  supervision: supervision of banks,
insurance companies and market intermediaries.
Recent international financial crises have underscored
the need to adopt and apply codes and standards of
good practice in economic and financial management
on a preventive basis. These standards have been
developed notably as a response to the need to develop
a framework for the liberalisation of capital flows,
particularly in emerging market economies. They are
touchstones enabling countries to define policies that
open the door to more stable and less crisis-prone
economic and  financial systems. Generally speaking,
standards are part of a broader trend that sees
multilateral surveillance taking better account of the
structural and institutional aspects of each economy.
International recognition of the need to propose
globally-applicable standards has led to the definition
and gradual implementation of an assessment
programme conducted by the Bretton Woods
institutions — the IMF and the World Bank.
This paper first emphasises that the effective
implementation of international codes and standards
is important to the consolidation of  international
financial stability. Next, it highlights the challenges
and difficulties faced by emerging market economies,
public authorities (international financial institutions
and national authorities) and the private sector. It ends
by suggesting a few avenues that may be explored to
resolve these difficulties.
1| The contribution made by codes and standards
to financial stability
Even when fully implemented, codes and standards
cannot in themselves prevent the emergence of
international financial crises, it would be an illusion
to believe otherwise. Crises in fact result from a host
of political, economic, financial and institutional
factors that the codes and standards cannot by
themselves aspire to control. Codes and standards
can nevertheless contribute significantly to
preventing crises — insofar as possible —, toning
down their effects or even helping to resolve them.
1|1 The structural flaws uncovered
by financial crises
In the wake of the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s
that revealed the flaws in the financial organisation
and structure of the afflicted countries, increased
importance has been attached to the observance of
codes and standards. The Mexican crisis of 1995 and
the Asian crises of 1997-1998 notably brought to light
the serious damage that could result from structural
deficiencies in the economic and financial sector of
emerging economies 1 :
– The lack of transparency in emerging economies, which
may include shortcomings with regard to the
disclosure of reliable and exhaustive statistical data,
accounting practices that do not comply with
international standards or even inadequate auditing
laws, was conducive to the emergence and
development of financial crises. The Asian crises
that broke out in 1997-1998 are a case in point. The
lack or inadequacy of key data for assessing a
country’s vulnerability, such as the level of its
available reserves or short-term debt, made it more
difficult for analysts to accurately assess the
prevailing risks. The official foreign-exchange
reserve figures thus gave an inaccurate view of the
1 Literature on the flaws uncovered by the financial crises in Asia and Latin America is abundant, see notably: Goldstein, “The Asian Financial
Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications”, Institute for International Economics n°55, June 1998; Lane et al., “IMF-Supported programs
in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, A preliminary Assessment”, IMF, 1999; Lindgren et al., “Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy”, IMF,
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amounts that central banks could actually mobilise.
For instance, in Thailand, gross amounts did not
include the central bank’s liabilities on the
foreign-exchange future markets, while in South
Korea, they did not encompass foreign currency
loans to commercial banks, which could not be
recovered immediately. Furthermore, the
proportion of bad debts on banks’ balance sheets
was considerably under-estimated. This situation
prompted volatile behaviour among foreign
investors, who at first continued to grant unduly
high amounts of financing and then, upon waking
up to the financial deterioration of these economies,
drastically cut back their investments, thereby
triggering massive capital outflows. It also increased
spillover effects as international investors withdrew
their capital from all emerging countries regardless
of financial situations peculiar to each economy.
– Insufficient rules and inadequate prudential
supervision of banking and financial systems were
major factors of vulnerability that delayed the
resolution of liquidity and solvency problems,
even as the liberalisation of capital flows
increased the fragility of these systems. The crises
were in fact most acute in countries that had led
private agents to take on short-term foreign
currency debt, without laying down hedging rules
for liquidity or exchange-rate risk. By encouraging
over-investment and the creation of excess
capacity, these practices opened the way for the
unwarranted valuation of asset prices, especially
property prices.
In Mexico, the widespread IMF-backed liberalisation
of the financial sector as from 1989, whereby credit
controls were lifted, interest rates deregulated and
banks privatised, fired the distribution of loans,
which, in real terms, posted an annual rise of 25%
from 1991 to 1994. These loans were granted notably
to risky borrowers, even as a public expenditure
reduction policy was implemented, reducing the
public sector’s net borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the
world. This development was not accompanied by
the overhaul of internal control procedures in banks
and the strengthening of the indispensable
regulatory and prudential framework. For instance,
rules for diversifying risk were only introduced
belatedly in 1992 and 1994. This situation
contributed to the marked deterioration in the
quality of banking portfolios, leading to an increase
in the ratio of doubtful loans from 9% to 12% from
December 1994 to December 1995.  Lastly, it was
more difficult to assess the quality of own funds
and the soundness of banks given that solvency
rules did not always comply with the Basel
Committee’s recommendations.
Similarly, in Asia, financial intermediaries’
vulnerability was exacerbated by the excessive
increase in the share of doubtful loans on banks’
balance sheets. The proportion of bad debts in
bank loans ranged from 15% to 35% in Thailand,
Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1997-1998. The
inadequate risk-diversification rules led to undue
exposure to property, and particularly, to
property developers. At end-1997, the share of
property loans in total loans thus exceeded 40%
in Hong Kong, 30% in Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia, 25% in Indonesia and 15% in
South Korea and the Philippines. Loan
classification and provisioning rules proved too
lax, with some loans not having been downgraded
to doubtful loans’ status even after they had not
been paid off for over 6 or even 12 months.  Lastly,
the lack of prudential rules on liquidity allowed
banks’ short-term debt to mushroom. This debt
was partly denominated in foreign currency,
some of which was recycled into long-term loans
in local currency. The outcome was maturity
mismatches between banking assets and liabilities
as well as exchange-rate risks that were
underestimated by investors.
– Inadequate corporate governance spawned bad
management practices. Opaque corporate
management methods and the close links that
prevailed between companies and government
gave credence to the existence of an implicit
government guarantee that created a situation of
moral hazard in several emerging economies. In
Mexico, in 1994-1995, the implicit guarantee myth
was embellished by official declarations,
notwithstanding the existence of a deposit
guarantee fund explicitly limiting the coverage of
losses to the amounts transferable under the fund.
In Asia, the absence of such systems did not ward
off moral hazard. This situation  was compounded
by a long tradition of government-promoted
domestic investment, by these countries’ sound
public finances, and even, in the case of Indonesia,
by the blurring of boundaries between government
assets and assets held by close associates of
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In Korea, excessive credit growth was directed
mainly at the conglomerates — the chaebols —
which profited from a complex system of
intra-group cross-guarantee debt. It remains
uncertain whether South and East Asia have to
date achieved sufficient progress in this area 2.
– Lastly, the weak legal framework, in particular
inadequate bankruptcy regimes, which did not
sufficiently protect lenders, aggravated these
countries’ problems, even as the crisis made it
necessary to restructure debts and companies.
1|2 The contribution made by
international codes and
standards to financial stability
Analysis of the deficiencies (mainly structural)
exposed by the recent financial crises has led the
international community to promote codes and
standards at the international level. Although it is
difficult, by definition, to evaluate the impact of the
implementation of these standards, the adoption of
good practices in all the areas covered by the codes
and standards can only help to reduce the frequency
and magnitude of financial crises.
Reinforcing the prevention of financial crises
While codes and standards cannot forestall all
financial crises, they can at least reduce their
frequency. It would therefore be appropriate to
implement them in the various areas of prevention
set out below.
– Setting up an efficient  information system: when
investors and market participants have access to
calibrated, reliable and diversified information,
they are able to show more discrimination
with regard to risks, and make better investment
decisions. Such information allows
better-informed expectations and, all other things
being equal, lessens the risk of accumulating
positions that are economically unjustifiable and
whose abrupt liquidation could trigger excessive
market volatility. The IMF staff has recently
pointed out again deficiencies in the disclosure
of accurate economic and financial data,
particularly on the non-financial corporate
sector’s debt and exposure to exchange-rate and
interest-rate risks 3.
– Setting out rules to guide the economic policies of
emerging economies:  the crises in Latin America
showed, inter alia, how important such rules are
for the management of public and/or external
debt. The objective of standards is to ensure
greater transparency with regard to authorities’
objectives, and strengthen decision-making
procedures.
– Strengthening the soundness of financial
intermediaries: this notably involves increasing
their own funds and hedging against
exchange-rate and liquidity risks. Non-compliance
with the Basel Committee’s core principles for
effective banking supervision has been shown to
have an indirect impact on the robustness of
financial systems. Prudential standards also cover
other financial intermediaries such as insurance
companies and investment firms.
– Creating a framework that fosters investment: this
is a prerequisite for more stable international
investment, particularly foreign direct
investment (FDI). FDI is particularly sensitive to
the existence of an equity-investment friendly
environment offering strong guarantees that
foreign investors’ rights are respected.
Curtailing contagion risks
Codes and standards can make a positive contribution
to international financial stability by lessening both
the magnitude and impact of contagion:
– Various standards aim at achieving greater
transparency, mainly via the disclosure of
comprehensive and reliable statistical data. This
data must be made available to investors on the
financial markets to enable them to be more
selective with regard to risks in emerging
economies. Increased discernment helps to
dampen financial contagion effects, arising from
transmission of financial strains in a specific
country (e.g. the pervasive widening of bond
spreads, the collapse of stock prices or pressures
on the  exchange rate) to other countries in the
same geographical area or even to all other
emerging economies.
2  See Yung Chul Park, “The East Asian Dilemma: Restructuring out or Growing Out ?”, Essays in International Economics n°223,
Princeton , 2001, p. 36.
3  “Biennial review of the Implementation of the Fund’s surveillance and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision -Overview”, IMF, 14 March 2002 (available
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– Effective implementation of standards also enables
emerging economies to build up their financial
systems’ resilience to volatile capital flows. It does so
in two ways: first, capital flows are less volatile in
countries where investment flows are in the form
of FDI. The implementation of international codes
and standards makes countries more attractive to
investors seeking sustainable investment
opportunities. Second, value losses and liquidity
pressures prompted by capital flight are better
absorbed when effective prudential supervision
requires financial intermediaries to maintain
adequate own funds and hedge against
exchange-rate and liquidity risks.
Codes and standards can facilitate
crisis resolution
The existence of an appropriate legal framework for
business failure that specifies the rights and duties of
debtors and creditors is one of the factors that facilitate
crisis resolution.  It is worth noting that the overhaul
of the bankruptcy law in Argentina has been identified
as one of the conditions for the successful
implementation of a possible IMF programme. By the
same token, an adequate accounting framework
makes it possible to recognise losses more quickly in
all companies and particularly financial institutions,
which compels these firms to rapidly take
indispensable recovery measures. Lastly, in addition
to the benefits it bestows on banks themselves,
effective banking supervision induces banks to step
up their efforts to persuade non-financial companies
to carry out necessary financial  restructuring.
2| Reinforcing the contribution made by codes
and standards to financial stability
Since the end of the 1990s, the international
community, mainly under the auspices of the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), has developed a
strategy for promoting codes and standards
(see Box 1). A number of challenges still need to be
taken up to enhance the role played by codes and
standards in the prevention of financial crises. These
include fostering emerging economies’ ownership
Box 1
International strategy for the dissemination of codes and standards
Work carried out within the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has engendered two reports that define a clear
strategy with regard to international standards:
– The first report, published in March 2000 1, draws up a list of 12 standards that are deemed essential for the
stability of the international financial system. It also identifies three key factors for the implementation of
codes and standards: promoting emerging economies’ ownership of codes and standards, providing incentives
to foster implementation and assessment of codes and standards and mobilising resources, e.g. technical
assistance, required for the adoption process.
– The second report, put out in August 2001 2, spotlights the drive to enhance the role played by the private and
public sectors in the effective implementation of standards, notwithstanding market professionals’ increased
adherence to the major codes and standards. This report provides the best summary of codes and standards
available to date 3.
The international strategy thus set out is backed by several international entities, notably the G7 and the G20.
  1 Drawn up by the Task Force on the Implementation of Standards, set up in September 1999 and chaired by A. Sheng (Securities and
Futures Commission, Hong Kong).
  2 Drawn up by the Follow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards,  set up in April 2000 and chaired by
A. Nawrath (German Ministry of Finance).
  3 These reports may be downloaded from the FSF website (http.//www.fsforum.org).148 FSR • International codes and standards • November 2002
of standards, redefining the means of action and
priorities of the official public-sector bodies
responsible for promoting the adoption and
enforcement of these standards, and enhancing the
role played by the private sector in encouraging their
implementation.
2|1 Emerging economy ownership
of codes and standards
While the benefits of adopting codes and standards
are, in principle, widely recognised, some countries
are reluctant to enforce their implementation as they
believe they have been little involved in the standard
setting process. Strengthening emerging economies’
ownership of codes and standards is therefore crucial
to successful implementation.  Sense of ownership
must be heightened, not only at the definition stage,
but also at the implementation and assessment
stages.
The legitimacy of current codes
and standards
A number of emerging countries challenge the
legitimacy of certain international codes and
standards and consider that they were not
sufficiently involved in their definition. At the Spring
Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in
April 2002, the G24, the informal grouping of
emerging and developing economies, expressed the
wish that their countries be allowed to play a greater
role in international organisations. Emerging market
countries’ acceptance of codes and standards would
indeed be facilitated if these countries were involved
in their design as well as the assessment of their
implementation, as is the custom for the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision or the
International Organisation of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), for instance. With regard to
codes and standards established by international
institutions other than the IMF and the World Bank,
co-operation should not be hindered by the fact that
not all countries are members of these institutions.
Incidentally, the task forces on the implementation
of standards set up under the FSF included experts
from countries that are not members of the FSF.
Defining national priorities
and gradual implementation
One of the major factors underpinning emerging
economies’ reluctance to implement codes and
standards is their belief that these standards do not
adequately take into account their level of economic
development, their ability to take on board
exceedingly ambitious reform programmes, or their
value systems. The implementation of international
codes and standards has indeed been a drawn-out
process in the developed countries themselves.
Emerging countries often criticise the large number
of standards, the wide variety of areas they cover as
well as their complexity and constantly evolving
nature. They argue that, notwithstanding technical
assistance provided by the IMF and the World Bank,
the implementation of standards on occasion draws
on an excessive amount of resources. While it is
important to preserve the universal nature of
standards, it is also appropriate to define a number of
domestic priorities to address the issues raised by
emerging countries:
– The designation of 12 standards deemed by the
FSF to deserve priority implementation
(see Appendix) was a first response to the need
for selectivity.
– Moreover, out of these 12 standards, countries
may legitimately define priorities when setting a
timetable for implementation. Given
characteristics specific to each country, such as
the level of development of the various segments
of the financial sector or the institutional capacity
to successfully bring systems up to date, it is
unrealistic to aim to achieve compliance within
a short period without fixing priorities.
Furthermore, countries must adopt a more gradual
approach to the implementation of codes and standards
when a substantial amount of reform is required. The
standardisation of statistics is an example of this gradual
approach. The IMF has developed two separate bodies
of standards governing the publication of economic and
financial data: the broad Special Data Dissemination
Standard (SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination
System (GDDS), which is less stringent than the SDDS.
The Basel Committee’s regulations on solvency are
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review, “Basel I” regulations are targeted at
internationally-active banks, but may prove inadequate
when applied to banks in certain emerging economies.
The 1997 definition of globally-applicable “core principles”
for banking supervision provided banking  supervisors
with a common framework of reference for the
standardisation of supervisory techniques. The
methodological document on the review of the Basel
principles contains essential and additional criteria.
Essential criteria apply to all countries, while additional
criteria mainly concern industrialised countries.  In
respect of corporate governance, the Institute of
International Finance (IIF), an organisation that brings
together several private banks, published a new set of
standards that apply specifically to emerging market
countries in February 2002 5.
Assessing the observance of codes
and standards
Assessment of the enforcement of codes and standards
is a lynchpin in the international community’s drive
to ensure the effective implementation of recognised
standards.  Emerging economies play a major and
twofold role in assessment:
– Firstly, assessments, at least those carried out
jointly by the IMF and the World Bank, are
undergone on a voluntary basis.  This voluntary
principle has a number of advantages, chief
among them being that countries may decide
when to undergo assessment, and define the
scope of the evaluation. Depending on the
agreement reached with the country being
assessed, the IMF and the World Bank may adjust
the number of standard assessments. The
voluntary approach makes the system of codes
and standards a flexible management and
assistance tool for all countries.   It is in the
international community’s interest, in the
circumstances, to put in place incentives to
strengthen emerging countries’ ownership of
codes and standards.
– Secondly, emerging market countries can carry
out self assessment. Self assessment is of vital
importance because:
– it enables national authorities to be involved
and to take responsibility, regardless of
whether external assessments are carried out,
– it substantially smoothes the assessment
process carried out by international
organisations,
– lastly, and most importantly, it leads to a better
understanding of standards.
Peer reviews — the assessment of observance of
codes and standards within limited groups of “peers”,
i.e.  other countries or specialised or regional
international organisations — also contribute
significantly to improving the dissemination of
standards. The April 2002 publication of a white
paper on corporate governance in Russia, the fruit
of co-operation between the Russian authorities and
the OECD is an example of peer review 6. This paper
should be followed by similar documents on other
regions. Another example of peer review is Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) members’ mutual
compliance exercise in respect of the
48 recommendations on money laundering and the
financing of terrorism.
2|2 Optimising the role played
by countries and IFIs
Reinforcing incentives available to IFIs
While IFIs’ approach does not impinge on state
sovereignty, these institutions have at their disposal
a battery of tools to encourage countries’ adoption
of codes and standards.  There are two ways in which
these incentive tools may be enhanced:
– A better integration of the observance of codes and
standards in the surveillance process, irrespective
of whether these assessments are conducted by
the IMF itself or other standard setting bodies.
The findings of these assessments are already
largely included in the Article IV consultation
reports of the IMF. However, since the
assessments are not made in a regular basis, it is
important to make sure that subsequent
Article IV reports take new developments into
account. Conversely, an assessment exercise
could be launched in a given area on the basis of
a deficiency observed in the course of an Article
IV consultation.  These are avenues worth
exploring which could promote greater
convergence of the two processes by making
Article IV surveillance more efficient and by
5  For further information, see the IIF’s website (www.iif.com).
6  The White Paper may be downloaded from the OECD’s website (www.oecd.org).150 FSR • International codes and standards • November 2002
giving wider visibility and a stronger impact to
the assessment of the observance of codes and
standards.
– Making assessments of observance a more widely-used
criterion in IMF conditionnality. The IMF’s
Contingent Credit Line (CCL) is the only facility
which recognises assessments of observance as
part of conditionnality: its eligibility criteria
explicitly refer to the level of compliance with
the Fund’s Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS). This approach could be extended to other
IMF facilities. The fixing of specific targets,
together with a timetable for observance of codes
and standards could be brought to bear in the
decision to grant or renew financial assistance to
a member state, whether in the form of
stand-by arrangements, the extended fund
facility, or even the supplemental reserve facility.
Stepping up co-operation between IFIs, other
standard setting bodies and governments
with regard to the assessment of observance
of codes and standards
In order to enhance the role played by codes and
standards, it is necessary to extend the assessment
process to a larger number of countries and to update
assessments, as their quality determines their
practical interest for investors.  This calls for
reflection on the fit between targets defined and
resources available, especially within the IMF and
the World Bank, the main leading agencies
(see Box 2). The Financial Stability Forum has
pinpointed the need for developed countries to
provide more technical assistance for the
implementation of codes and standards in emerging
economies. Four additional types of measures may
also be considered:
– Countries likely to be assessed should be more
carefully selected. More discrimination should also
be applied when choosing the right frequency for
updating these assessments as a uniform
procedure is hardly appropriate. Defining
pertinent criteria nevertheless poses certain
difficulties. Giving priority to “systemically
important” countries would mean excluding
certain emerging market economies. However,
these countries may be those that have the most
to gain from the implementation of codes and
standards. Conversely, assessment of the
implementation of codes and standards in some
major industrialised countries may be deemed to
be of lesser priority as these countries have often
achieved high levels of compliance with standards.
– Clear priorities should be defined for the areas
covered. It would be unrealistic to believe that
the international community has the means to
assess the implementation of all standards in all
emerging and developing economies, and that it
can, in addition, provide sufficient technical
assistance.
– It is important to determine to what extent public
organisations other than the Bretton Woods
institutions can step up their own contribution to
the assessment process.The increased
involvement of other specialised international
organisations, such as the OECD, which are also
standard setting bodies, in the assessment process
could be encouraged, especially in areas where the
IMF and the World Bank have limited expertise.
For instance, to date, the World Bank has
performed very few assessments of private-sector
corporate governance. Closer co-operation with
other organisations would undoubtedly be
beneficial in this field.  It is nevertheless important
that the Bretton Woods institutions continue to play
a central role in the assessment process for
two main reasons. Firstly, because their
involvement helps to preserve the overall
consistency of the process and prevent the
duplication of work. Secondly, because the ROSCs
and FSAPs (see Box 2), which are carried out by
teams working under the authority of universal
institutions and debated by the Boards of these
institutions, possess, as a result, a political
legitimacy that cannot be bestowed on them by
any other organisation.
– Lastly, the overall efficacy of the assistance
provided could be enhanced by improving the
coordination of bilateral technical assistance
initiatives.
Promoting disclosure of assessment results
The external assessment process is being held back
by some countries’ reluctance to divulge external
assessment results.  An inordinately large proportion
of assessments performed are yet to be published
on the IMF’s website  7. At end-April 2001,
7 See www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/index.htm or www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html. As regards France, assessment reports have been drawn
up and published on the transparency of public finances and of monetary and financial policies. For the euro area, reports have been published
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Box 2
External assessment of observance of codes and standards
The IMF and the World Bank head the external assessment of observance of international codes and standards
and have done so since 1999. Tasks are shared out between the two institutions according to their respective
areas of competence.
– The IMF issues reports on the observance of codes and standards governing data dissemination and the
transparency of fiscal policies (Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes — ROSCs). An assessment
of the quality of the data (Data Quality Assessment Framework — DQAF) is to be added henceforth to data
dissemination ROSCs within an IMF-defined framework. DQAFs may be conducted either by countries
themselves, or by the IMF with countries’ consent. The IMF shall publish the results of these assessments
on a dedicated website: the Data Quality Reference Site — DQRS.
– The World Bank assesses the implementation of corporate codes and standards in areas such as corporate
governance, accounting and auditing, insolvency and creditor rights.
– Reports on the enforcement of codes and standards applicable to the financial sector are drawn up jointly
by the two institutions. The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) necessarily covers aspects of
transparency of monetary and financial policy and banking supervision. It also generally covers areas
relating to markets, insurance and payment and securities settlement systems. Detailed reports for each
standard are drawn up on the basis of the assessments carried out within the FSAP. Each constitutes a
ROSC module. Within the FSAP framework, the G7 recently requested the two institutions to assess
observance of standards on money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities based on FATF
recommendations 1.
ROSCs are divided into specific “modules” for each group of associated standards. IMF staff regularly report to
their Executive Board on progress made in the drawing up of ROSCs (related press releases may be found on
the IMF’s website). The ROSC programme has grown in leaps and bounds: at end-April 2002, 228 assessment
modules had been conducted by the two institutions and 76 countries had been evaluated for at least one
module.
IMF and World Bank initiatives with regard to the external assessment of international codes and standards
have been expedited by contributions from other organisations:
– International standard setting organisations have developed assessment methodologies, published guidelines
for the implementation of standards or even developed self-assessment procedures. In 2001, for instance,
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) spearheaded a self-assessment process
based on three questionnaires that are currently being finalised 2. Similarly, in October 1999, the Basel
Committee devised a methodology to assess application of the core principles for effective banking
supervision  3. Further, these organisations provided the IMF and the World Bank with experts in their
spheres of competence.
– National authorities also make a contribution to the assessment process by providing technical assistance.
In this pursuit, the Banque de France seconded experts on short or long-term assignments to the international
institutions in order to expand their human resources in its areas of competence, namely monetary and
exchange rate policy, payment and securities settlement systems, banking supervision and the fight against
money laundering.
 1 Declaration by Ministers of Finances and Governors of G7 countries, 20 April 2002.
 2 For further information on this initiative, see IOSCO’s website (www.iosco.org).
 3 It may be found on the following website: http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbs81.htm.152 FSR • International codes and standards • November 2002
63 assessment modules, i.e. virtually 28% of all
modules, had still not been published.
Nonetheless, the Executive Board of the IMF rightly
reaffirmed the principle of voluntary publication in
January 2001. It is consistent with the treatment
applied to the outcome of IMF consultations
conducted within the framework of Article IV
surveillance, and beyond that, with the co-operative
nature of the IMF.  Moreover, the decision not to
publish assessment findings may stem from the wish
to refrain from provoking excessive market volatility
incommensurate with the macroeconomic
fundamentals of the country concerned. Assessment
findings could for example bring to light accounting
losses that have been understated or hidden, or
highlight inadequacies in financial disclosure, which
could lead investors to shy away from the country
concerned, and thus create financing difficulties.
That said, the decision not to publish assessment
results could be misinterpreted by investors, who in
such cases are deprived of important information,
notably for comparison purposes. It is therefore
worth pursuing efforts to persuade countries
assessed that the publication of assessments would
be positively welcomed by the markets, provided that
it is accompanied by a credible undertaking by
national authorities to implement corrective
measures.
2|3 The private sector can offer
strong incentives to foster
implementation of codes
and standards
By providing incentives to promote the
implementation of codes and standards and by
increasing the number of assessments performed,
the private-sector could contribute substantially to
the dissemination of codes and standards.
The private sector could help to extend
the implementation of codes and standards
Market participants can contribute significantly to
encouraging emerging market economies to adopt
and implement standards, by taking these standards
increasingly into account in their investment
strategies, their risk-analysis and the pricing of new
issues. Emerging countries will have greater
incentive to increase the quality of their banking
supervision or the reliability of their statistics if by
doing so they derive benefits in terms of market
access and financing conditions. Investors therefore
ought to incorporate qualitative factors on the
structural features of the economies in which they
have decided to invest into their risk-measurement
matrices. They should do so even if assessments by
international organisations are not presented in the
form of “ratings”.
To offer support, the private sector needs to
familiarise itself increasingly with codes and
standards and assessments. Surveys carried out by
the FSF in 2000 and 2001 in fact showed that the
private sector’s knowledge of ROSCs was imperfect,
and moreover that it considered these reports to be
little suited to its operational requirements. The
preference among certain categories of market
participants was for summarised information, such
as ratings, rather than qualitative assessments. The
outreach meetings conducted recently by some
international organisations, as well as the policy of
publishing the main source documents and
discussion papers on codes and standards on the
Internet, are aimed at building private sector
awareness of the benefits that may be derived from
assessment exercises. These efforts should be
pursued and intensified.
The private sector may also support
and build on international initiatives
on codes and standards
Private organisations may  usefully contribute to and
expand on official initiatives for assessing the observance
of codes and standards. This trend is in fact part of a
more general development, in line, for instance, with
the role played by various non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in setting standards and ratings
with regard to the environment, ethics etc.  Recent
initiatives have demonstrated that the private sector
can help to adapt certain standards, notably
accounting and corporate governance standards. A
few examples follow.
– The “e-Standards Forum” website (a subscription
website) 8 provides general-public information on
the observance of codes and standards
in 81 countries in a summarised and
easily-accessible form.
8 www.estandardsforum.com. The main private institutions contributing to this website are Oxford Analytica, the Reinventing Bretton Woods
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– Standard and Poor’s  has developed a “corporate
governance score” for companies 9.
– PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) has devised an
“opacity index” that measures the costs arising
from lack of transparency.
These private sector initiatives could be particularly
useful for two reasons:
– The private sector re-processes and structures
information, adapting it to investors’ needs.
Surveys carried out show that many investors put
a premium on concise and readable information.
– In certain fields, the private sector directly
assesses compliance with certain codes and
standards, supplementing or  standing in for
official bodies. It is worth noting that private
assessment initiatives already exist for sovereign
country ratings.
These private sector initiatives should not lead IFIs
to curtail their monitoring of codes and standards.
They must continue to play a central role in this
regard, thanks mainly to their privileged access to
high-quality information obtained from member
states. However, in some areas, the private sector
may provide the “missing link” between the
qualitative assessments performed by IFIs, which
cannot rate their members, and potential users on
the markets, such as country-risk analysts, risk
managers or investors.
9 http://www.standardandpoors.com/ProductsandServices/RiskManagementSolutions.
The smooth functioning of a globalised and increasingly interdependent world economy requires the
adoption and observance of common rules. In the light of recent economic crises, it has become clear
that the effective implementation of codes and standards could contribute to strengthening financial
stability at the domestic level, and thereby, reduce spillover risks.
The development of processes to assess implementation of codes and standards is a noteworthy step
forward in the surveillance methods employed by the IMF. The assessment process derives its
uniqueness and efficiency from two main features. Firstly, it is inherently co-operative. Assessment
involves co-operation between countries and IFIs and also invites contributions from external agents,
such as central bank experts or supervisory bodies. This is a significant leap forwards in the
improvement of surveillance procedures. Secondly, given its global pretensions, the assessment process
enables each country to steer its assessment in relation to its specific features.
The international community has nevertheless underestimated the burden that the implementation
and assessment of standards represents for emerging economies as well as for IFIs and other standard
setting bodies. It must be borne in mind that the results of this strategy shall be visible only in the
medium term. It is therefore crucial that the countries concerned and the international community
define priorities to incorporate this strategy within a realistic framework.154 FSR • International codes and standards • November 2002
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